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 26.1  Introduction 
 International adjudication, i.e. the use of international tribunals and 
arbitral bodies to decide international disputes, has experienced a rapid 
growth since World War II. While traditional arbitration may have expe-
rienced its heyday in the period between the Peace Conferences of 1899 
and 1907, and thereaft er until World War II, the number of interna-
tional courts and tribunals has increased in the last 70 years and they are 
deciding more cases than ever before. Th is is particularly true in the area 
of international trade law, but to a lesser extent also in other fi elds such as 
border disputes and the law of the sea. 1 
 Th is growth has been accompanied by a rise in challenges and diffi  -
culties for those courts and tribunals. One of these challenges is their 
legitimacy, 2 which has been neglected for many years in the context of 
international law, for many reasons. 3 We use a simple concept of legiti-
macy where the justifi cation of the process and the acceptance of the actor 
are of primary importance, as discussed in more detail in  Section 26.2 . In 
recent years, however, the  raison d’être of international adjudicative bodies 
 1  We have deliberately not included arbitral procedures in so- called Investor- State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) in this chapter. While this may be one of the most interesting areas of 
the use of private lawyers (and especially large international law fi rms) we have limited the 
scope of this contribution to procedures involving States only. Future work will certainly 
be undertaken to see to what extent the presence of non- State actors as parties to a dispute 
alters the fi nding of this contribution. Th e same is true for the dispute settlement system 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), where many (developing) States are using highly 
specialized law fi rms. Where useful, specifi c references to this system have been included 
in this chapter without an in- depth analysis that would go beyond its scope. 
 2  For a defi nition of how this term is used in this contribution see below  Section 2.2 . 
 3  See  Christopher A.  Th omas , ‘ Th e Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law ’ 
( 2014 )  24 ( 4 )  Th e Oxford Journal of Legal Studies  730 – 732 . 
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and their (dis)advantages are increasingly debated. 4 Th is debate aff ects the 
acceptance of international tribunals, 5 their functioning, 6 and the behav-
iour of some of their key actors. Among those actors, only the role of pri-
vate counsel is the object of analysis in this contribution. Although these 
lawyers cannot be properly described as ‘unseen actors’ (because they 
are ‘seen’ performing some roles for litigant parties and their function of 
assistance to litigant parties is expressly enshrined in international texts), 
the legitimacy of assigning them certain ‘unseen’ roles merits discussion. 7 
 As Jean- Pierre Cot (a Member of the International Tribunal of the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) since 2002)  has stated, private counsel ‘have 
always played an important role in international litigation’. 8 Nonetheless, 
their role has been subject to many criticisms, 9 the main one being their 
 4  An international adjudicative body can be defi ned as ‘a dispute resolution mechanism that 
decides disputes between litigants, at least one of whom is a state’; see, for example,  Nienke 
 Grossman , ‘ Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies ’ ( 2009 )  41  Th e George 
Washington International Law Review 107,  111 . 
 5  Th is is particularly true for more complex international tribunals that go beyond State- 
to- State dispute settlement. For instance, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela denounced the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (ICSID Convention), 18 March 1965, into force 14 October 1966 (1967), See 
Grossman, ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’, 107– 108. In addition, the 
Republic of Burundi and the Republic of the Philippines withdrew their membership from 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, into force 1 July 2002 
(37 ILM (1998) 999; UN doc. A/ CONF.183/ 9 of 17 July 1998), which is the founding treaty 
of the International Criminal Court, see  www.icc- cpi.int/ Pages/ item.aspx?name=pr1371 
(27 July 2018). Th e WTO Appellate body is also facing a crisis as the USA is blocking 
the appointment and reappointment of this body’s members. Consequently, the Appellate 
Body is currently composed of only four members instead of seven and, if nothing is done, 
this Body will be unable to operate by 10 December 2019, see  www.wto.org/ english/ tratop_ 
e/ dispu_ e/ ab_ members_ descrp_ e.htm (27 July 2018). 
 6  Th is issue has already been addressed, in a more general way, by various scholars, notably 
Grossman, ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’;  Susan D.  Franck , ‘ Th e 
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:  Privatizing Public International Law 
Th rough Inconsistent Decisions ’ ( 2005 )  73  Fordham Law Review  1521 ;  Nienke  Grossman , 
‘ Th e Normative Legitimacy of International Courts ’ ( 2013 )  86  Temple Law Review  61 ;  Tullio 
 Treves , ‘ Aspects of legitimacy of International Courts and Tribunals ’ in  Rüdiger  Wolfrum 
and  Volker  Röben (eds.),  Legitimacy in international Law ( Springer ,  2008 ), pp. 169 – 188 . 
 7  In their unseen role, we are talking about the representation of a litigant State by a private 
lawyer. Th is role is not expressly enshrined in international texts, see below pp. 7– 8. 
 8  Jean- Pierre  Cot , ‘ Appearing “for” or “on Behalf of ” a State: Th e Role of Private Counsel 
Before International Tribunals ’, in  Nisuke  Nando ,  Edward  McWhinney ,  Rüdiger  Wolfrum , 
and  Betsy Baker  Röben (eds.),  Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda , vol. II, ( Kluwer Law 
International ,  2002 ), p.  835 . 
 9  See WTO, Panel Report,  European Communities  – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas , adopted 22 May 1997, WT/ DS27/ R/ GTM, p. 294, para. 7.12; see 
also criticisms examined in  Section 3.1.1 . 
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legitimacy. Th e question is normally not whether those lawyers possess 
the necessary legitimacy to assume a specifi c role on behalf of a State 
but rather, what measures need to be undertaken to enhance their legit-
imacy. Th is chapter addresses this issue with particular attention to pri-
vate counsel who act on behalf of developing countries, 10 who use private 
lawyers more frequently than developed ones. Developing countries also 
regularly entrust private lawyers with more extensive tasks than devel-
oped States do, as the latter have large groups of specialized lawyers within 
their own administrations. 11 
 Among international adjudicative bodies, this chapter surveys only 
tribunals adjudicating disputes between States and, more specifi cally, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and lTLOS. Th is choice may be 
explained by the following methodological reasons. Firstly, the ICJ has a 
specifi c place in international adjudication given its position as an organ 
of the United Nations and as the only permanent court whose jurisdiction 
is not limited to a specifi c area of international law or specifi c region of the 
world and given its infl uence on the development of international law. As 
this inquiry may involve public international law interests, it would seem 
inconceivable to not include the most important public international 
court, also referred to as the World Court. Secondly, the ICJ and ITLOS 
clearly distinguish between the function of judges and the function of 
litigants’ representatives. 12 As this chapter investigates how international 
tribunals perceive the legitimacy of private lawyers representing States, this 
distinction may be very important. Th irdly, the transparency of tribunals’ 
proceedings was a selection criterion. Before some tribunals, such as the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) , proceedings are confi dential. 13 
 10  Th is expression has not received an offi  cial defi nition. For this study, developing countries 
are considered to be those that have become members of the Advisory Centre on WTO 
Law (ACWL) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) that are entitled to the services of 
ACWL, making a total of 79 countries; see  www.acwl.ch/ download/ ql/ Services_ of_ the_ 
ACWL.pdf (03 July 2017). 
 11  See below 
 12  See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945, 
3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat 1031; TS 993; 39 AJIL Supp. 215, Article 17 (ICJ Statute); see also 
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 396 X, Annex VI, Article 7(2) (ITLOS 
Statute). Th is is not the case in ICSID arbitration, for example, where States’ representatives 
may act also as arbitrators. 
 13  See, however, the interesting contribution by  Jessica C.  Pearlman , ‘ Participation by Private 
Counsel in World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Proceedings ’ ( 1999 )  30 ( 2 )  Law 
and Policy in International Business  399 – 416 . 
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Th e same is traditionally true for arbitral proceedings. In contrast, the 
ICJ and ITLOS are characterized by the transparency of their proceedings 
as well as the availability of their reasoned decisions. References to other 
tribunals are included where relevant. 
 In their judgments, international courts and tribunals do not tend 
to refer to any discussions concerning the role of a private counsel 
representing a State, unless they perceive a specifi c problem. Whenever 
international adjudicative bodies do include such references, these 
form useful sources to identify the factors that infl uence the perception 
of whether the exercised authority of private counsel is legitimate. We 
suggest examining criticisms made by international adjudicative bodies, 
in their judgments, regarding private counsel’s presence and participation 
in international dispute settlement proceedings (usually alongside offi  -
cial State representatives). Reviewing these criticisms serves to identify 
and discuss standards that could be used to enhance a private lawyer’s 
legitimacy. 
 For methodological reasons, the present analysis fi rst clarifi es the 
framework of the study by defi ning the key terms at issue ( Section 26.2 ) 
before looking at ( Section 26.3 ) factors that may challenge or enhance pri-
vate counsel’s legitimacy (with a particular focus on how accountability 
can infl uence legitimacy and what needs to be done in order to clarify this 
liability and, consequently, enhance private lawyers’ legitimacy).  Section 
26.4 summarizes the fi ndings and suggests areas for further research. 
 26.2  Terminology 
 26.2.1  Private Lawyers 
 In this section, we defi ne the term ‘private lawyer ’, i.e. identify who 
appears as private counsel or agent in inter- State litigation, and explain 
why private lawyers are employed by developing States  – sometimes 
even as agents and not simply as (additional) counsel. Th e term ‘private 
counsel ’ is sometimes used in the literature as a synonym for ‘private 
lawyer’ (without clear diff erentiation as to the exact authority he or she 
has in specifi c proceedings). In this chapter, we clearly distinguish those 
situations where we think the exact powers make a diff erence, in partic-
ular, when it comes to the use of agents before certain international courts 
and tribunals. 
 Th e term ‘counsel’ has not been clearly defi ned in international texts, 
but is in practice oft en used as a synonym for ‘advocate’. For example, 
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according to Article 42(2) of the ICJ Statute, ‘counsel or advocates before 
the Court’ may assist the agents of States, whereby the use of the con-
junction ‘or’ implies an equivalence between those two terms. 14 Th e Study 
Group of the  International Law Association (ILA) on the Practice and 
Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals proposed to consider as 
counsel,
 any person discharging the functions of counsel by representing, 
appearing on behalf of, or providing legal advice to a party in 
proceedings before an international court or tribunal, however such 
person may be described, and whether or not the person has professional 
legal training or is admitted as a member of a bar association or other 
professional body 15 
 According to this defi nition, the affi  liation with a bar association or 
professional legal training is not a mandatory requirement. Rather, 
the focus lies on the functions performed:  to be qualifi ed as counsel, 
the person must represent, appear on behalf of, or provide legal advice 
to one of the parties to the dispute. Th is wide defi nition seems in the 
interest of State parties given the diversity of people who have appeared 
as counsel before internationals courts and tribunals, notably lawyers 
affi  liated with a national bar, lawyers who are not affi  liated with a 
national bar, 16 and law professors. 17 For the purpose of this chapter, 
only the case of private counsel (i.e. lawyers operating in private prac-
tice, to the exclusion of those working in the public administration) 
who are retained by foreign States other than their own governments 
is examined. 
 14  ‘Th e uniform current practice is to use the two terms interchangeably, or even conjointly. 
Th e distinction in kind is rather between “counsel and advocates”, on the one hand, and 
“advisers” on the other’, Sir Franklin Berman, ‘Article 42’ in:   Andreas  Zimmermann , 
 Christian  Tomuschat ,  Karin  Oellers- Frahm , and  Christian J.  Tams (eds.),  Th e Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, a Commentary , 2nd edn ( Oxford University Press ,  2012 ), pp. 
 1083 – 1084 (note 33). 
 15  Article 1 of Th e Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing before 
International Courts and Tribunals adopted 27 September 2010 (hereinaft er Th e 
Hague Principles), available at  www.ucl.ac.uk/ laws/ cict/ docs/ Hague_ Sept2010.pdf (20 
August 2017). 
 16  For a defi nition of ‘lawyer’, see  Arman  Sarvarian ,  Professional Ethics at the International 
Bar ( Oxford University Press ,  2014 ), pp.  121 – 127 . 
 17  According to Alain Pellet, the ICJ bar is composed ‘almost exclusively of univer-
sity professors’, see  Alain  Pellet , ‘ Th e Role of the International Lawyer in International 
Litigation ’ in  Chanaka  Wickremasinghe (ed.),  Th e International Lawyer as Practitioner , 
( British Institute of International and Comparative Law ,  2000 ), p.  150 . 
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 In inter- State adjudication, lawyers in private practice have expressly 
been charged to ‘assist’ litigant States and not to represent them. 18 Th e 
main diff erence between ‘assistance’ and ‘representation’ lies in the binding 
powers of the State representative (also called agent ): while the govern-
ment needs to endorse the assistant’s actions in order for the latter to be 
valid, the agent possesses the power to bind the represented State. 19 It is 
the agent who receives communications on behalf of the litigant States, 20 
signs pleadings, 21 and reads a party’s fi nal submissions. 22 An agent may 
also appear as counsel and but not vice versa. 23 
 Some international texts provide the counsel with a representative role 
but only for non- State actors (this contributes to the confusion that some-
times exists in the literature and statements made in public) 24 . Although 
private lawyers have not been expressly granted the role of State represen-
tative in legal documents, 25 some (mainly developing) countries, based 
on the principle of free representation , have selected private lawyers 
instead of public servants or political fi gureheads as their representatives 
(agents ). 26 At the same time, the roles of the agent and counsel may 
 18  Article 42(2) ICJ Statute, Article 53 ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal (ITLOS/ 8) as adopted 
on 28 October 1997 and amended on 15 March 2001, 21 September 2001, and 17 March 
2009, available at  www.itlos.org/ fi leadmin/ itlos/ documents/ basic_ texts/ Itlos_ 8_ E_ 17_ 03_ 
09.pdf (8 December 2017). 
 19  Sir Franklin Berman, ‘Article 42’, p. 1080 (note 10). 
 20  Article 40(1), ICJ Rules. 
 21  Article 52, ICJ Rules, Article 65, ITLOS Rules. 
 22  Article 60(2), ICJ Rules, Article 75(2), ITLOS Rules; see also  Case concerning the Northern 
Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Oral arguments, ICJ Reports 1963, 15 (250). 
 23  For an overview of the agent’s role, see  Michael J.  Matheson , ‘ Practical Aspects of the Agent’s 
Role in Cases Before the International Court ’ ( 2002 )  1  Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals  467 – 479 ; see also  Shabtai  Rosenne , ‘ Th e Agent in Litigation in the 
International Court of Justice ’, in  William  Kaplan and  Donald  McRae (eds.),  Law, Policy 
and International Justice: Essays in Honour of Maxwell Cohen ( McGill- Queen’s University 
Press ,  1993 ), pp.  41 – 68 . 
 24  Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Consolidated 
version of Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
annexed to the Treaties, as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 741/ 2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 August 2012 (OJ L 228, 23.8.2012, p. 1). 
 25  Th is statement must be qualifi ed if appearing ‘on behalf of ’ a State (according to Article 
292 of United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, signed 10 December 1982, into force 
16 November 1944, it is considered to be State representation. One author distinguishes 
between ‘acting as a State representative’ and ‘acting on behalf of a State’; see Cot, ‘Appearing 
“for” or “on behalf of ” a State’, pp. 835– 848. 
 26  Under international law, it is improper to consider as representation the fact that a 
State sends someone who will defend its interests before an international tribunal. Th e 
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sometimes overlap in terms of their real infl uence on the dispute settle-
ment proceedings and the representation of the States involved. 
 In contrast to developed countries, which usually possess suffi  cient legal 
capacity to take part in international proceedings in an eff ective manner, 
developing countries oft en lack the specifi c legal expertise necessary to 
successfully participate in those proceedings. 27 Unfortunately, ‘there is no 
systematic survey, both qualitative and quantitative, of the availability of 
international legal expertise in the foreign policy machinery of States in 
general, not to speak of developing countries’. 28 Nonetheless, it would seem 
that most developing States lack the required international legal expertise, 29 
so they need to call upon external resources to address this lack of human 
resources. Th ose external resources are usually found in private practice 
(international law fi rms) or among specialized academics off ering their 
services; exceptionally an institutional mechanism may exist. For example, 
developing countries can have recourse to the legal aid services of a purpose- 
built international organization, such as the WTO’s Advisory Centre on 
WTO Law (ACWL). 30 Otherwise, they must turn to international law fi rms. 
 Many governments have chosen this last option for counsel and some-
times even as agents . In proceedings before ITLOS, for instance, the 
majority of developing countries retain foreign lawyers also as agents. Th is 
has been the case of countries such as Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 31 
proper representation in international law implies that the State’s representative, the State 
represented and third persons are subjects of international law, see  Angelo Piero  Sereni , 
 La représentation en droit international ( Brill/ Nijhoff  ,  1948 ), p.  80 . However, many inter-
national texts use the word ‘representation’ to characterize the relationship between a 
country and its organ or employees who must defend its interests before international 
tribunals. Rosenne suggests using this expression in its ‘accepted diplomatic sense’, see 
Rosenne, ‘Th e Agent in Litigation in the International Court of Justice’, p. 61. 
 27  It seems that developed countries even tend to infl uence the awards of those adjudi-
cative bodies, see  Mark  Daku and  Krzysztof  Pelc , ‘ Who Holds Infl uence over WTO 
Jurisprudence? ’ ( 2017 )  20 ( 2 )  Journal of International Economic Law  245 – 249 . 
 28  Cesare P.R.  Romano , ‘ International Justice and Developing Countries (Continued):  A 
Qualitative Analysis ’ ( 2002 )  1 ( 3 )  Th e Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals ,  539 – 611 , 557. 
 29  As noted in the preamble of the Agreement establishing the WTO ACWL. Th is remark, 
made in the context of the WTO DSB, may be extended to other international tribunals. 
 30  Certain WTO members established the ACWL in order to ‘provide developing countries 
and LDCs with the legal capacity necessary to enable them to take full advantage of the 
opportunities off ered by the WTO’,  www.acwl.ch/ acwl- mission/ (3 August 2017). 
 31  Th e M/ V ‘SAIGA’ Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v.  Guinea), Prompt Release , 
 Judgment, ITLOS Report 1997, p. 16 ;  Th e M/ V ‘SAIGA’(N°2) Case (Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines v. Guinea), Prompt Release, Judgment, ITLOS Report 1999, p. 10 ;  ‘Juno Trader’ 
(Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v.  Guinea- Bissau), Prompt Release, Judgment, ITLOS 
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Guinea, 32 Guinea- Bissau, 33 Seychelles, 34 Belize, 35 and Panama. 36 Before 
the ICJ, for example, Ethiopia, 37 Liberia, 38 Djibouti, 39 and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo 40 have been represented by private counsel. 
 Aside from the lack of legal capacity, the presence of private lawyers 
within governmental delegations is also due to the complexity of inter-
national courts’ proceedings. To illustrate this complexity, ‘WTO law 
consists of a complex web of over 20 agreements, which – together with the 
attached Member- specifi c schedules of concessions and commitments – 
cover more than 20,000 pages ’ . 41 Procedural rules are oft en not suffi  -
ciently detailed to ensure that those who are not familiar with them can 
use those rules in an effi  cient way. Th is leads to the perception that opacity 
surrounds international proceedings. 
 In the case of international arbitration, for example, procedural rules 
can even be established on an ad hoc basis and offi  cials of developing 
countries may oft en feel disoriented if they do not have prior experi-
ence in dealing with these kinds of issue. Against this background, pri-
vate counsel who knows the ‘rules of the game, the usual practice and 
even the layout’ 42 of those courts and tribunals appears to have a com-
parative advantage over developing States’ civil servants and other private 
practitioners. 
Reports 2004, p. 17;  M/ V ‘Louisa’ (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain), 
Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2013, p. 4. 
 32  Th e M/ V ‘SAIGA’ Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v.  Guinea), Prompt Release , 
 Judgment, ITLOS Report 1997, p. 16 ;  Th e M/ V ‘SAIGA’(N°2) Case (Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines v. Guinea), Prompt Release, Judgment, ITLOS Report 1999, p. 10. 
 33  ‘Juno Trader’ (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v.  Guinea- Bissau), Prompt Release , 
Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2004, p.17;  M/ V ‘Virginia G’ (Panama/ Guinea- Bissau) , 
Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2014, p. 4. 
 34  Th e ‘Monte Confurco’ Case (Seychelles v. France), Prompt Release , Judgment of 18 December 
2000, p. 86. 
 35  Th e ‘Grand Prince’ Case (Belize v. France), Prompt Release , Judgment of 20 April 2001, p. 17. 
 36  Th e ‘Camouco’ Case (Panama v. France), Prompt Release , Judgment of 7 February 2000, 
p. 10;  Th e ‘Chaisiri Reefer 2’ Case (Panama v. Yemen), Prompt Release , 13 July 2001, p. 82; 
 M/ V ‘Virginia G’ (Panama/ Guinea- Bissau) , Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2014, p. 4. 
 37  ‘South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) , Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962: ICJ Report, 1962, p. 319. 
 38  Ibid . 
 39  Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France ), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 177. 
 40  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) , 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168. 
 41  See  www.acwl.ch/ acwl- mission/ (20 August 2017). 
 42  Pellet, ‘Th e Role of the International Lawyer in International Litigation’, p. 149. 
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 26.2.2  Legitimacy 
 Th e concept of ‘legitimacy’ is not easy to defi ne, 43 even though many 
scholars have attempted over time to identify its constitutive elements. 44 
For the purpose of this chapter, legitimacy stands for the justifi cation and 
the acceptance of a political authority. 45 Th e private lawyer serving as 
counsel in international proceedings can be regarded as such a political 
authority because he or she plays an active role in inter- State proceedings. 
Th rough this assignment, the private lawyer is given a specifi c role in the 
representation of the State, including with regard to the outcome that will 
aff ect the State as such. 
 Th is authority may be legitimized by its source, its procedure, the 
outcomes it has produced, or a combination of these elements. 46 In the 
case of counsel acting on behalf of a State, the question of legitimacy 
arises, in particular, in the case of private lawyers acting as agents , rather 
than as State counsel. In fact, the agent benefi ts from an important del-
egation of authority and can bind the represented country with his or 
her actions. 47 Is the authority of the agent- lawyer perceived as legiti-
mate? But even a simple counsel may play a very active role and a sig-
nifi cant part in specifi c proceedings that justify the questions of his or 
her legitimacy. 
 43  Legitimacy may be described as a ‘nebulous concept’, see  Yuval  Shany ,  Assessing the 
Eff ectiveness of International Courts ( Oxford University Press ,  2014 ), p.   138 ; see also 
Th omas, ‘Th e Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’, 733; Alain Pellet, 
‘Legitimacy of Legislative and Executive Actions of International Institutions ’ in  R. 
 Wolfrum and  V.  Röben (eds.),  Legitimacy in International Law , p.  63 . 
 44  Grossman, ‘Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies’, 115– 122; Th omas, ‘Th e 
Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’, 734– 742;  Mattias  Kumm , ‘ Th e 
Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis ’ ( 2004 )  15 
 EJIL  907 , 917. 
 45  Many scholars use this term in that way, see Grossman, ‘Legitimacy and International 
Adjudicative Bodies’, 115; see also various contributors in Wolfrum and Röben,  Legitimacy 
in International Law , pp. 1– 24, 25– 62, 309– 317;  Nienke  Grossman ,  Harlan Grant  Cohen , 
 Andreas  Føllesdal , and  Geir  Ulfstein , ‘ Legitimacy and International Courts – A Framework ’ 
in  Nienke  Grossman ,  Harlan Grant  Cohen ,  Andreas  Føllesdal , and  Geir  Ulfstein (eds.), 
 Legitimacy and International Courts , ( Cambridge University Press ,  2018 ), p.  3 . 
 46  Rüdiger  Wolfrum , ‘ Legitimacy in International Law from a Legal Perspective:  Some 
Introductory Considerations ’ in Wolfrum and Röben (eds.),  Legitimacy in International 
Law , p.  6 . 
 47  See Berman, ‘Article 42’, pp.  1080– 1083; see also Matheson, ‘Practical Aspects of the 
Agent’s Role in Cases before the International Court’, 467– 479; Rosenne, ‘Th e Agent in 
Litigation in the International Court of Justice’, pp. 41– 68. 
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 In the context of international law, there are some important arguments 
in favour of the legitimacy of private lawyers being used as counsel (or 
even agent). Th e fi rst argument is the consent of the represented State. 48 
Th e moment a private person is assigned by the State to represent this 
State before an international adjudicative body, this lawyer is ‘legitimized’ 
to exercise this authority on behalf of that State. 49 Assuming that this is 
the free will of the competent State organs, this decision benefi ts from the 
same legitimacy as the appointing authority has under domestic law. 
 In addition, the specifi c expertise of the appointed counsel provides a 
strong argument in favour of the legitimate authority of private council 
(outcome- based legitimacy). Only the appointment of (foreign) private 
persons (experts) can assure the correct representation of certain States 
and the defence of their best interests 50 . 
 However, the present discussion is not focused on the actual legiti-
macy of the counsel but rather on the perception of this legitimacy. Is the 
authority of the agent- lawyer perceived as legitimate? Who must perceive 
the agent- lawyer’s authority as legitimate in the context of international 
adjudication? In the case of private counsel, the relevant constituencies are 
fi rst and foremost States, but also international adjudicatory bodies, poten-
tial litigants, and even the population (citizens) of the State appointing 
such a counsel. 51 Th is chapter focuses exclusively on how international 
courts and tribunals perceive the exercise of public authority by lawyers on 
behalf of States, though the wider question on the legitimacy as perceived 
by other actors defi nitely deserves attention in future research. 
 26.3  Factors Infl uencing Legitimacy 
 Several criticisms regarding private counsels’ legitimacy acting on behalf 
of governments are based on their supposed lack of proximity to the 
 48  Rüdiger  Wolfrum , ‘ Legitimacy in International Law from a Legal Perspective:  Some 
Introductory Considerations ’, in Wolfrum and Röben (eds.),  Legitimacy in International 
Law , pp. 6– 10 . 
 49  Ibid ., pp. 10– 24. Th is State consent tends to be insuffi  cient as the base of the legitimacy in 
some aspects of international law and must be completed with other elements such as the 
test of democratic governance, for example;  ibid ., pp. 20– 24. 
 50  WTO, Appellate Body Report,  European Communities – Bananas , adopted 9 September 
1997, WT/ DS27/ AB/ R, p. 7, para. 12; Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) case No. AA 
227,  Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. Th e Russian Federation , Final award, 18 July 
2014, p. 577. 
 51  Shany,  Assessing the Eff ectiveness of International Courts , p. 139. 
9781108485852_pi-612.indd   553 22-Apr-19   1:31:52 PM
Andreas R. Ziegler and Kabre R. Jonathan554
554
represented State ( Section 26.3.1 ) and the vagueness of rules regulating 
their accountability ( Section 26.3.2 ). 
 26.3.1  Proximity with the Represented State 
 26.3.1.1  Private Counsel’s Proximity to the Represented State 
 As an introduction to this factor, we would like to give two examples: in 
a dispute between Belize and France, one member of ITLOS noted ‘an 
unusual feature’:
 Th e Agent appointed by Belize is not well placed, as a non- Belizean 
lawyer in private practice in Spain, to explain to the Tribunal the seeming 
inconsistencies in the statements of diff erent government departments 
and agencies in Belize. 52 
 In another case, an ICJ judge, made the following statement:
 Furthermore, in the present case, I  note that a State appearing before 
the Court is not represented by a person holding high offi  ce in the 
Government acting as Agent, but by a private lawyer from another, highly 
developed, country. Th is has rarely been the case in the history of the 
Court and reinforces my feeling that a question arises as to whether the 
case is brought to the Court in the interest of the State involved or for some 
other reason. 53 
 In those two cases, lawyers were criticized for being of a nationality other 
than that of the country for which they were acting and for not holding 
highest offi  ce in the local government 54 . An aggravating factor seemed to 
be that they were not only acting as counsel but also as agent for the States 
concerned. A  legitimacy- infl uencing factor may be derived from those 
reproaches:  the proximity of a legal representative with the represented 
country. Th e underlying idea is that the more the counsel (or at least the 
agent) has a close relationship with the represented country, the stronger 
his or her legitimacy. Th is proximity can be assessed using criteria such 
 52  Th e ‘Grand Prince’ Case (Belize v. France), Prompt Release , Judgment, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Anderson, 20 April 2001. 
 53  Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) , 
Provisional Measures, Order of 1 July 2000, I.C.J. Reports 2000, Declaration of Judge Oda, 
at 132. 
 54  In a recent case, the representativeness of a private lawyer acting as the State’s represen-
tative was also questioned, see  M/ V ‘Norstar’ (Panama v.  Italy), Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2016, pp.  18– 26; see also Declaration of Judge Cot, ITLOS 
Reports 2016, p. 2. 
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as nationality or participation in the performance of a public interest 
mission or the exercise of highest offi  ce in the country. 
 Th is standard could, however, simply have been infl uenced by 
governments’ past practice (i.e. tradition) in terms of representation . 55 In 
fact, in their relations with others States and international organizations, 
States used to send delegations that included a head of delegation, other 
delegates, diplomatic staff , and administrative, technical, and service 
staff . 56 Ministers or other persons holding high offi  ce in the represented 
governments used to be part of such delegations. 57 Even if a State has the 
sovereign right to do so, the appointment of persons who do not possess 
its nationality seems more the exception than the rule. 58 Th is practice 
could simply have led to the belief that State representation should be 
assumed by (high) government offi  cials whose mission is to work on a 
daily basis for the safeguarding of a government’s public interests . In the 
United States, for example, there is a diff erence in the traditional under-
standing between the role of governmental entities’ attorneys and private 
parties’ attorneys. In this traditionally ‘adversarial’ system both functions 
are described as attorneys but characterized diff erently. Th e fi rst serve 
the public interest while the second, primarily, defend individual self- 
interests of their private clients. 59 
 In support of this legitimacy factor, it has been suggested that the absence 
of proximity between the agent and its government could result in improper 
consequences for the conduct of the international proceedings. Th is may be 
less true for other legal systems (such as those on the European continent), 
where many legal systems attribute specifi c duties in the public interest to 
private lawyers when defending private parties against the State. 
 55  In the years of the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (GATT), for instance, only 
government lawyers or government trade experts were representing governments in dis-
pute settlement proceedings, see WTO, Appellate Body Report,  European Communities – 
Bananas , adopted 9 September 1997, WT/ DS27/ AB/ R, pp. 5– 6, paras. 8– 9. 
 56  Article 45 of the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with 
International Organizations of a Universal Character, 14 March 1975 (hereinaft er ‘Vienna 
Convention’) (Un Doc. A/ Conf. 67/ 16; 1975 Digest of US Practice in International Law 
40). ‘Although this Convention has not yet entered into force, its Part 111 (Delegations to 
Organs and to Conferences) particularly represents a refl ection of customary international 
law in this area’, see  Rutsel Silvestre J.  Martha , ‘ Representation of Parties in World Trade 
Disputes ’ ( 1997 )  31 ( 2 )  Journal of World Trade  86 . 
 57  Article 50, Vienna Convention. 
 58  Article 73, Vienna Convention; see also  Shabtai  Rosenne ,  Th e Law and the Practice of the 
International Court 1920– 2005 ( Brill ,  2006 ), pp.  1120 – 1121 . 
 59  Steven K.  Berenson , ‘ Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government 
Lawyers Serve the Public Interest? ’ ( 2000 )  41 ( 4 )  Boston College Law Review  796 ff  . 
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 26.3.1.2  Consequences of the Lack of Proximity Between the 
Represented Government and its Counsel/ Agent 
 Th e problems arising from non- proximity between authorities of 
represented government and counsel or agent are numerous. Only two of 
them are to be analysed here. Firstly, the private counsel can provide the 
tribunal with inaccurate information. As representative, the agent (and to 
a lesser degree the counsel) is the link between the court and the litigant 
State. Given this position, the agent is expected to be highly reliable. 60 
Th is requires legal expertise but also a good knowledge of local realities. 
When the agent is not a national (or at least resident) of the represented 
country, he or she may give the international tribunal incorrect informa-
tion or be unable to provide all the information requested, notably when 
this information relates to the government’s domestic aff airs. In the  Grand 
Prince Case, the agent appointed by Belize provided ‘incomplete and con-
tradictory information concerning the registration of the vessel and the 
position of Belize as to the nationality of the Grand Prince’. 61 Additionally, 
Judge Anderson ‘would have favoured asking for more information about 
the legal status of the Grand Prince at the material times’. 62 But given the 
fact that the agent was not familiar with local practices of diff erent gov-
ernment departments and agencies in Belize, the Tribunal decided ‘not to 
seek further information from the Applicant’. 63 In the  Juno Trader Case, 
it seems that there was a divergence between information provided by 
the agent and  ‘ the view of the law as it emerges from the decision of the 
Regional Court of Bissau. 64 
 Judge Cot summed up the situation (under the particular circumstances 
typical for the application for release of a vessel under Article 292 of the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea): ‘Th e lawyer- agent is not neces-
sarily in close contact with the authorities of the fl ag State. Th e credibility 
and reliability of the information he provides as to the legal position of the 
fl ag State may be questionable’. 65 
 60  See Cot, ‘Appearing “for” or “on behalf of ” a State’, p. 842. Another author adds that the 
agent has to ‘understand and faithfully refl ect the national policy decisions of its gov-
ernment ’, see Matheson, ‘Practical Aspects of the Agent’s Role in Cases Before the 
International Court’, 473. 
 61  ‘Grand Prince’, Declaration of Judge  ad hoc Cot, para. 14. 
 62  ‘Grand Prince’, Separate Opinion of Judge Anderson. 
 63  Ibid . 
 64  ‘Juno Trader’ , Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Mensah and Wolfrum, 59. 
 65  ‘Grand Prince’, Declaration of Judge  ad hoc Cot, para. 14. 
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 Nevertheless, the proximity with national authorities does not guar-
antee that the information provided is credible and reliable. Even civil 
servants have provided false information in some proceedings 66 or were 
unable to adequately defend the interests of their State. 67 If the civil ser-
vant does not possess relevant experience in international litigation, his 
or her knowledge of local matters may be insuffi  cient to properly defend 
the interest of the government. Adding civil servants to a State delegation 
who will provide the international lawyer (possibly leading the delega-
tion) with correct factual information might form a workable compro-
mise. Th is may avoid contradictions between the information provided to 
a court and the facts (as occurred in the  ‘Juno Trader’ case). 68 
 Secondly, the lack of permanent association between the agent- 
lawyer and the State he or she is representing can lead to a confl ict of 
interests. Judge Oda underlined the risk of confl ict of interests in at least 
one situation. 69 Judge Cot also expressed his concern of ‘a proliferation 
of applications that are manifestly unfounded inspired by law fi rms for 
reasons having nothing to do with the interests of the Applicant State’. 70 
 Th ose confl icts can derive from multiple sources. Only a limited number 
of them can be discussed here. Firstly, besides the recourse to the judicial 
mode, States may use other amicable modes of international dispute set-
tlement with a view to fi nding a diplomatic solution to a dispute: this is the 
obligation to negotiate. 71 Th ey have various means to fulfi l this obligation, 
 66  In one case ( Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar v.  Bahrain) , Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, p.  40), Qatar’s representatives 
produced 82 false documents during the written proceedings. However, those documents 
were withdrawn aft er an objection from Bahrain. In this aff air, Qatar was represented by 
the Secretary- General of the Cabinet of the Government of the State of Qatar and it seems 
that the outside counsel, retained by Qatar, had not been aware of any fraud, see  M/ V 
‘Louisa’, Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, ITLOS Reports 2013, 114. 
 67  In the  CDC Group Case, the governmental agents of the Republic of Seychelles have 
demonstrated their incompetence to defend their State’s interests, notably with counter- 
memorial incorrectly draft ed and poor management of witness, see  CDC Group PLC 
v. Republic of Seychelles , ICSID Case N° ARB/ 02/ 14, 17 December 2003, 8. 
 68  Th e ‘Juno Trader’ , Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Mensah and Wolfrum, 59. 
 69  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) , 
Provisional Measures, Order of the 1 July 2000, ICJ Reports 2000, Declaration of Judge 
Oda,132. 
 70  ‘Grand Prince’ , Declaration of Judge  ad hoc Cot, para. 13. 
 71  ‘ (a) the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving 
at an agreement, and not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort 
of prior condition for the automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in 
the absence of agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the 
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notably ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements’. 72 Depending on 
the type of dispute, it may be helpful to make use of other means and not 
only (ab)use of judicial means because the judicial settlement of interna-
tional disputes  ‘ is simply an alternative to the direct and friendly settlement 
of such disputes between the parties. ’ 73 In this situation, the private lawyers 
assisting a State may be confronted with confl icting interests since their 
expertise is mainly sought in the context of the judicial resolution and not 
the diplomatic resolution of the dispute. Th e private counsel, thereupon, 
may be tempted by ‘abuse of the right to institute proceedings before the 
Court’ without ‘fi rst exhausting diplomatic channels’. 74 
 Secondly, in the case of ITLOS prompt release disputes (Article 292 
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), the agent- lawyer may be 
tempted to give priority to private interests (those of the shipowner) at the 
expense of the represented government’s interests. Th is special procedure 
is a form of diplomatic protection that provides shipowners, via the fl ag 
State, a fast- track procedure and direct access to ITLOS. 75 Th e dispute 
remains intergovernmental but the interests of the shipowner are also 
involved. It is not unusual that the agent appointed by the State, appears to 
be, in reality, the shipowner’s counsel. 76 In such a case, it is reasonable to 
assume that this agent- lawyer will prioritize the interests of the shipowner 
over those of the fl ag State should those two interests confl ict. 
 Th irdly, counsel fees are another potential source for a confl ict of interests. 
Th e underlying idea is that some agent- lawyers can seek to let the procedure 
drag on as long as possible in their own economic interest. Th e WTO Panel 
in the  EC – Bananas case underlined the risk of high counsel fees. 77 Th e 
negotiations are meaningful’, see  North Sea Continental Shelf, (Federal Republic of Germany 
v. Denmark), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 48. 
 72  Article 33 of United Nations Charter. 
 73  Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex , Order of the 19 August 1929, PCIJ, Serie 
A, No. 22, p. 13. 
 74  Shigeru  Oda , ‘ Th e Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice:  A 
Myth?  – A  Statistical Analysis of Contentious Cases ’ ( 2000 )  49  Th e International and 
Comparative Law  265 . 
 75  Tullio  Treves , ‘ Article 292 ’, in  Alexander  Proelss (ed.),  United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, A Commentary ( Beck/ Hart/ Nomos ,  2017 ), p.  1882 . 
 76  In the  ‘Louisa’ case, the personal lawyer of the shipowner was solely in charge of Saint- 
Vincent and the Grenadines’ representation, given the withdrawal of governmental 
employees,  M/ V ‘Louisa’ , Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, 117. 
 77  ‘Th ere was a question in our minds whether the admission of private lawyers to Panel 
meetings, if it became a common practice, would be in the interest of smaller Members 
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ACWL is trying to solve this problem by off ering services similar to those 
of law fi rms at a relatively low cost. 78 However, the WTO- ACWL example 
is hard to transpose to other international adjudicative bodies given the 
diff erence in prices that may exist between lawyers’ fees for disputes before 
diff erent international courts and tribunals. For the time being, the WTO- 
ACWL remains unique, despite suggestions to use similar mechanisms, for 
example, in ISDS. 79 Philippe Sands (who is himself very actively assisting 
governments in international proceedings) gives an interesting  example of:
 a case in which the lawyer [is] acting as counsel for a State but where the 
legal fees are being paid by a private actor with an interest in the case. Th e 
interests of private actor and of State are diff erent. Th e lawyer gets diff erent 
instructions, one set of instructions from the person paying the legal fees, 
and another set of instructions from the State that appears as the party 
before the proceedings. What is counsel to do? ’ 80 
 Th ere is no clear answer from the outset. All those problems revive the 
debate on counsel regulation at the international level, which is the second 
 legitimacy- infl uencing factor. 
 26.3.2  Clarity of Accountability Rules 
 Our purpose is to establish a link between legitimacy and accountability, 
and to enhance this legitimacy through accountability. To do so, we 
examine the infl uence of accountability on the  perception of legitimacy 
and establish the current situation of counsel accountability both in term 
of binding rules and regulatory authorities. Th en, we conclude the exami-
nation by suggesting some ways of enhancing counsel liability. 
 In the analysis of a private counsel’s legitimacy, accountability tends 
to be a key element for it is assumed that a legitimate actor is necessarily 
an accountable actor. Many scholars have underlined the relationship 
as it could entail disproportionately large fi nancial burdens for them’, see Panel Report, 
 European Communities – Bananas , p. 294, para. 7.12. 
 78  For an overview of ACWL’s charges, see ACWL’s website,  www.acwl.ch/ download/ basic_ 
documents/ management_ board_ docs/ ACWL- MB- D- 2007- 7.pdf (6 August 2017). 
 79  For example, ‘Investment treaty cases are within a range of 5 to 10 times more expensive 
than trades disputes ’, see  Anna  Joubin- Bret ,  Establishing an International Advisory Centre 
on Investment Disputes? E15Initiative ( International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum ,  2015 ) , p. 2. 
 80  Philippe  Sands , ‘ Interaction between Counsel and International Courts and Arbitral 
Tribunals:  Ethical Standards for Counsel ’, in  Rüdiger  Wolfrum and  Ina  Gätzschmann 
(eds.),  International Dispute Settlement: Room for Innovations? ( Springer ,  2012 ), p.  128 . 
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between accountability and legitimacy. Th e main argument is that the 
absence of clarity in accountability rules could result in a crisis of confi -
dence that may refl ect negatively on legitimacy. 81 
 Furthermore - and from the point of view of  democratic legitimacy - 
national law seems to have more legitimacy than international law, given 
the presence of accountable institutions at national level. 82 Th is clarity 
may materialize with accountability rules that off er predictability and 
help counsel, litigant States, and other actors involved in international 
adjudication to plan their conduct accordingly. 
 26.3.2.1  Th e Lack of Transparency of Counsel 
Accountability Rules 
 Unlike the situation at the national level, there is no International Bar. 83 
Th e principal consequence is the lack of a clear normative framework for 
the regulation of private lawyers’ actions before international courts. 84 
Nonetheless, there are some principles related to counsel conduct before 
certain tribunals. 85 Do those principles also apply to agent- lawyers given 
 81  Th is WTO Panel was criticizing the lack of ‘disciplinary rules’ private lawyers have to 
comply with, see Panel report,  European Community – Bananas , p.  294, para. 7.12; see 
also  Doak  Bishop , ‘ Ethics in International Arbitration ’, in  Albert Jan  van den Berg (ed.), 
 Arbitration Advocacy in Changing Times, International Council for Commercial Arbitration 
(ICCA) Congress Series No. 15 ( Kluwer Law International ,  2011 ), p.   383 ; Franck, ‘Th e 
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 1584 ; Grossman, ‘Legitimacy and 
International Adjudicative Bodies’, 153. 
 82  Kumm, ‘Th e Legitimacy of International Law’, 924. 
 83  Judge James Crawford distinguishes between the situation of international criminal 
tribunals with an emerging international criminal law bar, the situation of courts and 
tribunals hearing inter- State disputes where it seems to be an invisible bar, and the situ-
ation of international investment tribunals where there is need of an international invest-
ment law bar, see James Crawford, ‘Th e International Law Bar, Essence before Existence?’ 
(January 2014) Th e University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 19/ 2014, 
pp. 343– 354. 
 84  Th e International Criminal Court’s  Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel stands out 
as an exception (annexed to Resolution ICC- ASP/ 4/ Res.1, and adopted at the third ple-
nary meeting on 2 December 2005, by consensus, available at  www.icc- cpi.int/ resource- 
library/ Documents/ COPCEng.pdf (10 August 2017). It has limited relevance for our study 
given the fact that States are not litigants before this court, but this Code can provide basic 
principles for international lawyers’ accountability. 
 85  Th ose principles may be found in texts such as the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers 
and the Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession, adopted by the 
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE), Th e Hague Principles on Ethical 
Standards for Counsel Appearing before International Courts and Tribunals adopted by 
the International Law Association (ILA), and the International Bar Association’s (IBA) 
Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration. 
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the specifi c nature of the agent’s function? ‘As the agent is the repre-
sentative of a sovereign State, is it conceivable that he be subject to the 
authority of a court whose jurisdiction depends upon the consent of that 
State?’ 86 Agents are not, by defi nition, responsible under international 
law. Th ey do not engage their personal responsibility for acts performed 
within the framework of their mandate of representation . Th e represented 
State is responsible for the actions of its agent. 87 However, some authors 
take exception to this conclusion and claim that agent- lawyers should 
face individual liability for their conduct 88 . We are also of the opinion 
that individuals acting before international courts and tribunals should 
be subject to specifi c rules and that their violations should lead to specifi c 
sanctions. 
 Nevertheless, at least one question remains. Which institution should 
be in charge of regulating private lawyers’ behaviour before an interna-
tional adjudicative body? Is it the international tribunal before which the 
private lawyer appears? 89 Are the lawyer’s national disciplinary bodies 
(public prosecutor, local court, bar association, and the like) well posi-
tioned? 90 Is it the represented State? 91 Is it a system of self- regulation with 
 86   ‘Grand Prince’ Case, Declaration of Judge  ad hoc Cot, para. 48. 
 87  Riad  Daoudi ,  Notion de représentation en droit international public ( Librairie Générale de 
Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris,  1980 ), pp.  65 – 66 . 
 88  ‘Grand Prince’ Case, Declaration of Judge  ad hoc Cot, para. 49; see also  Stephan  Wilske , 
‘ Sanctions against Counsel in International Arbitration – Possible, Desirable or Conceptual 
Confusion? ’ ( 2015 )  8 ( 2 )  Contemporary Arabian Asian Journal  141 , 164. 
 89  Th ose courts have no explicit powers to apply the basic principles identifi ed above. 
Moreover, those tribunals are reluctant to use their inherent powers to challenge agent- 
lawyers’ accountability. It seems that such powers do not include the power to take dis-
ciplinary action against a lawyer,  Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide 
v. Philippines , ICSID Case No. ARB/ 03/ 25, Decision on Application for Disqualifi cation of 
Counsel, 18 September 2008, para. 39. See also see Crawford, ‘Th e International Law Bar, 
Essence before Existence?’, p. 353. 
 90  Of course, they have a role to play in the regulation of counsel at international level. 
However, entrusting those bodies with the exclusive power to control lawyers appearing 
before international adjudicative bodies may give rise to confi dentiality concerns, addi-
tional costs, interference with international process, etc., see Wilske, ‘Sanctions against 
Counsel in International Arbitration’, 149– 153. 
 91  For international adjudicative bodies, it appears that agent- lawyers’ accountability does fall 
under the authority of the represented government, see  ‘Grand Prince’ Case , Declaration of 
Judge  ad hoc Cot, para. 15. Th e represented State has some means to sanction counsel mis-
conduct, notably by bringing that misconduct before its own domestic courts, but States 
rarely uses those means. But it is safe to assume that a government that relies on a private 
lawyer for the defence of its interests before an international court may not be able to prop-
erly regulate this counsel and sanction him/ her in case of wrongdoing. 
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advocates regulating themselves? 92 Another institution? 93 Usually, none of 
these has been provided expressly with the mission of regulating lawyers’ 
actions at the international level. 
 Th e absence of any institution clearly in charge of regulating counsel 
behaviour, coupled with the lack of coordination between these diff erent 
potential regulatory authorities, results in an ‘ethical no man’s land’ in 
which counsel operate with total freedom. 94 
 Th is all contributes to blurring counsel accountability and reinforces 
concerns regarding lawyers with almost unlimited powers that are not 
suffi  ciently counter- balanced and/ or controlled. Personally, we are of the 
opinion that the existence of an ‘International Bar’ is not a necessary pre-
requisite for the regulation of counsel accountability. In fact, we would 
rather suggest that international adjudicative bodies’ inherent powers are 
suffi  cient to deal with this issue. Th e appeal of entrusting international 
tribunals with the determination of the accountability of counsels or 
agents acting before them is twofold:  to clarify their accountability and 
thereby enhance their legitimacy. 
 26.3.2.2  Clear Accountability Rules for 
Enhanced Legitimacy? 
 Legitimizing the public authority of international institutions, organs, 
and norms is one of the goals international courts are expected to attain 
(external legitimization). 95 Th eir capacity to achieve this goal is directly 
linked to their own legitimacy in the eyes of their constituencies (internal 
legitimization). 96 International lawyers may contribute to this internal 
legitimacy given their expertise (even more so due to the fact that they may 
subsequently be retained as judges especially in international arbitration). 97 
 92  Before the ICJ, it appears that there is an acceptable system of self- regulation of the invis-
ible bar, see Crawford, ‘Th e International Bar, Essence before Existence?’, pp. 349– 350. 
 93  For example, the president of the Swiss Arbitration Association, Elliott Geisinger has 
called for the creation of a truly transnational body for the regulation of counsel appearing 
before international arbitral tribunals; see  Elliott  Geisinger , ‘ President’s Message: Counsel 
Ethics in International Arbitration – Could One Take Th ings a Step Further? ’ ( 2013 )  32 ( 3 ) 
 ASA BULL 2014  455 . 
 94  Catherine  Rogers , ‘ Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for 
International Arbitration ’ ( 2002 )  23 ( 2 )  Th e Michigan Journal of International Law 341, 
 341 – 342 . 
 95  Shany, ‘Assessing the Eff ectiveness of International Courts’, pp. 44– 46. 
 96  Ibid ., p. 137. 
 97  Th is appointment may enhance the image of international tribunals and their profession-
alism and provide additional justifi cations to support their authority,  ibid ., p. 147. 
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Th is legitimacy- conferring capacity could be extended to counsel acting 
before international courts and tribunals because these lawyers form part 
of the regime to which international courts are meant to contribute 98 and 
may be seen as having a contractual or quasi- contractual commitment vis- 
à- vis these courts. 99 
 In addition, a detailed regulation, such as ‘judicial formation governed 
by public international law’, 100 imposed by international public institutions 
may not be seen as favouring the private interests of law fi rms but rather 
the public interest of the international community in the administration 
of justice. 101 Th is would also enhance the image of counsel appearing 
before these courts and provide additional justifi cations to support 
lawyers’ authority as States’ representatives. 
 Moreover, making international adjudicative bodies responsible for 
counsel’s conduct at the international level may resolve many practical 
problems:  it will resolve concerns about breaches of confi dentiality, as 
well as restoring equal treatment among international lawyers since not 
all international lawyers are affi  liated with national bars. Th ose who are 
affi  liated with national bars may be subject to diff erent rules of conduct 
given diff erences among legal traditions. International bodies will apply 
the same rules to all lawyers appearing before them. However, there is a 
risk of fragmentation of accountability rules because of the diff erences 
between international courts and tribunals but this could be minimized 
through a dialogue between these institutions. 
 Finally, international tribunals’ inherent powers include not only the 
power to adopt rules of conduct for counsel (or agents if they are private 
  98  According to Principle (i)  of ‘Th e Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal 
Profession’, adopted on 24 November 2006, the lawyer is an ‘offi  cer of the Court’ or a 
‘minister of justice’. 
  99  Wilske, ‘Sanctions against Counsel in International Arbitration’, 163. 
 100  Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, d.d. v. Slovenia , ICSID Case No. ARB/ 05/ 24, Ruling regarding 
the participation of David Mildon QC in further stages of the proceedings, 6 May 2008, 
para. 33. 
 101  See also Stephan Schill, ‘Th e Case for Public Regulation of Professional Ethics for 
Counsel in International Arbitration’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 7 July 2017. International 
adjudicative bodies have a public function that goes beyond the private function to 
settle a dispute between litigant parties. In particular, those tribunals have to ensure the 
proper administration of international justice and to play a role in the clarifi cation and 
the progressive development of international law, see  Chester  Brown , ‘ Inherent Powers 
in International Adjudication ’, in  Cesare P.R.  Romano ,  Karen J.  Alter and  Yuval  Shany 
(eds.),  Th e Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication ( Oxford University Press , 
 2014 ), pp.  842 – 844 . 
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lawyers) 102 but also the power to sanction. 103 Th e latter is a more delicate 
matter, but it seems that international tribunals’ reluctance to exercise this 
control is mainly due to political reasons. 104 However, the public function 
of those tribunals means they need to take into consideration interests 
other than those of the parties to the dispute; an international case usually 
involves not only interests of the litigant States but also those of the inter-
national community in a whole. 105 
 26.4  Conclusions 
 A private lawyer’s legitimacy (especially when acting as an agent) is heavily 
dependent on his or her knowledge of the facts and the law as applicable 
to the State by which he or she was appointed. Th e lawyer must be com-
petent to represent the State, which this chapter has defi ned in terms of 
‘proximity with the represented State’. In cases where this proximity does 
not exist, this may have a negative impact on the defence of the interests 
of the represented government. Th is fi nding seems not particularly sur-
prising and is also known from domestic law (lawyer- client relationship) 
but problems in this respect have arisen in recent years before the inter-
national tribunals studied in this chapter. 
 Accountability  is also important for the analysis of the legitimacy of the 
use of private lawyers before international courts given the fact that the 
more transparent the normative framework of counsel regulation is, the 
more these lawyers’ legitimacy as State representatives will be enhanced. 
International tribunals can be entrusted with regulating counsel since, as 
international  public actors, they possess the legitimacy and the inherent 
competence to do so. Some of them have already exercised control over 
 102  International Criminal Court paved the way with the adoption of a code for counsel. Th e 
ICJ took a step in that direction with the adoption of its Practice Direction that contains 
some rules for counsel’s conduct. 
 103  International courts sanctioned counsel many times, see for example the  Hrvatska 
Elektroprivreda, d.d. v. Slovenia case. Th e ICJ rebuked counsel in three cases, see Crawford, 
‘Th e International Bar, Essence before Existence?’, pp. 349– 350. In  Th e Rompetrol Group 
N.V. v. Romania , ICSID Case No. ARB/ 06/ 3, Decision of the Tribunal on the Participation 
of a Counsel, 12 January 2010, para. 16, the Tribunal did not deny this power of control 
but rather restricted its scope. 
 104  See  Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Philippines , para. 39; see also Cot, 
‘Appearing “for” or “on behalf of ” a State’, 847; Crawford, ‘Th e International Bar, Essence 
before Existence?’, p. 350. 
 105  Brown, ‘Inherent Powers in International Adjudication’, p. 844. 
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counsel behaviour but a more widespread debate about the existing rules 
and necessary improvements would enhance the perception of private 
lawyers’ legitimacy In turn, this could contribute to improving the legiti-
macy of international dispute settlement as a whole. 
 We agree with Judge Cot when he says ‘[t] hat these are diffi  cult 
questions’, continuing that ‘[i]t falls primarily to the States parties to a 
dispute to answer them. Th ey, acting in sovereign fashion, organize their 
representation and the defence of their interests. Th ey do so at their own 
risk.’ 106 In sum, this chapter concludes that common international rules 
to safeguard the integrity and thereby the legitimacy of international dis-
pute settlement are needed when it comes to the use of private lawyers as 
counsels and agents. 
 106  ‘Grand Prince’, Declaration of Judge  ad hoc Cot, para. 15. 
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